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Incentive Eﬀects of Social




In most industrialized countries, old-age labor force participation has
declined dramatically during the last decades. Together with population
aging, this puts the social security systems of the industrialized countries
under a double threat: Retirees receive pensions for a longer time while
there are less workers per retiree to shoulder the ﬁnancial burden of the
pension system. The decline of old-age labor force participation has there-
fore turned attention to the incentive eﬀects of social security systems: Is a
signiﬁcant part of the threat homemade because pension systems provide
overly strong incentives to retire early? This “pull” view—that labor
supply has declined because early retirement provisions pull old workers
outo fe m ployment—is in contrast to the “push” view—that a secularly
declining demand for labor has created unemployment, one form of which
is to push older workers into early retirement.
The pull view is prominently put forward in a recent volume edited by
Gruber and Wise (1999). The authors from eleven countries argue that
the declining old-age labor force is strongly correlated with the incentives
created by generous early retirement provisions. Formal econometric anal-
yses (e.g., Stock and Wise 1990 for the United States; Meghir and
Whitehouse 1997 for the United Kingdom; Bo ¨rsch-Supan 1992, 2000 for
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281Germany) ﬁnd strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of variables measuring the
incentive eﬀects of pension rules (e.g., the option value to postpone re-
tirement).
Incentive eﬀects of pension rules are usually estimated under the as-
sumption that the institutional environment provides a single optimal
pathway for retirement. This optimal pathway then deﬁnesp r esent values
of retirement income at any retirement age, or an option value of postpon-
ing retirement at any prospective retirement age. However, most countries
provide competing pathways that include several early retirement options
in addition to normal retirement, typically at age sixty-ﬁve.
Jacobs et al. (1991) have stressed the variety of these pathway options
across Europe. Figure 9.1 shows how important these diﬀerent exit routes
or pathways are in Germany. It is particularly impressive that early retire-
ment due to a disability before age sixty (denoted by DI-2) was the most
common pathway in most of the years 1958–94, while “normal” retirement
(denoted by NR) has a share of less than 20 percent since the mid-1970s.
Fig. 9.1 Pathways to retirement
Notes: Theﬁ gure shows the share of pathways by year. The shaded areas are NR (normal
retirement); FR (ﬂexible retirement [only after the 1972 reform]); UN (early retirement be-
cause of unemployment); DI-1 (early retirement because of onset of disability after age sixty
[only after the 1972 reform]); DI-2 (early retirement because of onset of disability before
ages ixty).
Source: Verband deutscher Rentenversicherungstra ¨ger (1997)
282 Axel Bo ¨rsch-SupanEarly retirement due to unemployment (denoted by UN) increased steeply
in the early 1990s and accounted for roughly another 20 percent of labor
market exits. Complicating this picture even more, the exit routes depicted
in ﬁgure 9.1 are frequently preceded by preretirement schemes. These
schemes are industry- or company-speciﬁc and are popular not only in
Germany but also in many other European countries.
When measuring incentive eﬀects, one encounters two distinct problems
associated with this multitude of exit routes. First, early retirement options
such as the special provisions for disabled and unemployed workers can
eﬀectively be strategic variables for the employer and the employee. Em-
ployers may have an incentive to let the social security system pay for
the costs of restructuring the workforce, whereas employees may have an
incentive to enjoy leisure early at the expense of the contributors to the
social security system. As a result, constructs of incentive eﬀects that rely
on indicators for the availability of a certain pathway are endogenous. A
prime example of such an indicator is the reported health status, often
measured as the extent of disability in percent of full work ability. This is
frequently the legal prerequisite for early retirement and can be manipu-
lated at least to some extent, as has been controversially discussed by
Bound (1989) and Parsons (1991). The complicated interaction between
health and the eligibility for disability beneﬁts has been documented by a
working group led by John Rust (Benitez et al. 1998) as a prerequisite
forastructural estimation of incentive eﬀects due to disability beneﬁts,
improving on the large U.S. literature on this topic.
As econdt e chnical problem associated with the multitude of exit routes
is that the choice of a speciﬁc pathway to retirement is made when it is
notc lear whether certain options are actually relevant for the individual
contemplating early retirement. Again, disability is the prime example:
Even if the reported health status has not been manipulated, econometri-
cians face the problem that the outcome of the screening process for eligi-
bility is far from certain ex ante. If econometricians specify the option set
toog e nerously, they exaggerate the incentives at work and thus underesti-
mate the coeﬃciento fthe incentive variable. In turn, incentive eﬀects may
be overestimated—and thus the pull view of early retirement—if the op-
tion set is too restrictive.
This paper shows that ignoring the uncertainty and endogeneity of the
relevant institutional setting (i.e., the available pathways) can severely bias
the estimates of incentive eﬀects. The paper focuses on the disability op-
tion that provides particularly strong incentives. It proposes several esti-
mates to bound the “true” incentive eﬀects of social security on early re-
tirement in the face of uncertainty, and it uses an approximate two-stage
procedure to tackle the endogeneity problem.
Section 9.2 provides the institutional background of the German pen-
sion system and the early retirement incentives it creates. Section 9.3 intro-
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 283duces the data, a sample of German workers aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to seventy
drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel, and describes patterns of
retirement, disability and health in the sample. Section 9.4 presents esti-
mation results for several speciﬁcations aimed at correcting for uncertainty
and endogeneity of the disability beneﬁt eligibility. Section 9.5 concludes
and draws policy recommendations.
9.2 Incentives Created by the German Public Pension System
The German public pension system is particularly well suited to a mi-
croeconometric study of incentive eﬀects on labor force participation be-
cause it is almost universal and we do not need to account for a variety of
ﬁrm pension plans that create their own incentive eﬀects but are usually
notw ell captured in survey data (Bo ¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel 1998). The
homogeneity arises for two reasons. First, the German public pension sys-
tem is mandatory for every worker except for the self-employed and those
with very small labor incomes. Because almost all German workers have
been dependently employed atl east at some point in their working careers,
almost every worker has a claim on a public pension. Second, the system
has a very high replacement rate, generating net retirement incomes that
are currently about 70 percent of preretirement net earnings for a worker
with a forty-ﬁve-year earnings history and average lifetime earnings. This
is substantially higher than the corresponding U.S. net replacement rate
of about5 3p ercent. In addition, the system provides relatively generous
survivor beneﬁts that constitute a substantial proportion of the total pen-
sion liability. As a result, social security income represents about8 0p er-
cent of household income for households headed by persons aged sixty-
ﬁve and over; the remainder is divided about equally among ﬁrm pensions,
asset income, and private transfers.
A detailed description of the German public pension system is given by
Bo ¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999). In the sequel, we only summarize the
features that create incentives to retire early. Until 1972, retirement was
mandatory at age sixty-ﬁve. Early retirement was possible and frequent
through the disability pathway (see ﬁg. 9.1). With the landmark 1972 pen-
sion reform, several early retirement optionsw e r ei n t r oduced. Figure 9.1
shows that early retirement almost instantaneously substituted for a con-
siderable portion of disability beneﬁts—a fairly strong indication that dis-
ability status was not related only to health. The pension system estab-
lished in 1972 now provides old-age pensions for workers aged sixty and
older, and, for workers below age sixty, disability beneﬁts, which are con-
verted to old-age pensions at age sixty-ﬁve at the latest.
The main feature of the old-age pensions is ﬂexible retirement from age
sixty-three for workers with long service histories. In addition, retirement
at age sixty is possible for women, unemployed workers, and workers who
284 Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supancannot be employed appropriately for health or labor market reasons. It is
noteworthy that these features were introduced by the 1972 reform as so-
cial achievements before unemployment began to rise in the mid-1970s.
Only later was it realized that they helped to keep the unemployment rate
down. Twenty yearsa f ter the introduction of the various early retirement
options, the 1992 pension reform is attempting to close some of those op-
tions. However, the eﬀects are irrelevant for the current sample because
they will be visible only after the year 2004.
Old-age pension beneﬁts are computed on a lifetime contribution basis.
They are the product of four elements: (1) the employee’s relative wage
position, averaged over the entire earnings history, (2) the number of years
of service life, (3) several adjustment factors, and (4) the average pension
level. The ﬁrst three factors make up the “personal pension base,” which
is calculated when one is entering retirement. Old-age pensions are propor-
tional to length of service life, a speciﬁc feature of the German pension
system. The fourth factor determines the income distribution between
workers and pensioners in general and is adjusted annually to net wages.
Thus, productivity gains are transferred each year to all pensioners, not
only to new entrants. Due to a generous exemption, social security beneﬁts
are tax free unless income from other sources is high.
Early retirement incentives are created by the (lack of) adjustment fac-
tors. Before the 1992 pension reform, there was no explicit adjustment of
beneﬁts when a worker retired earlier than age sixty-ﬁve, except for a bo-
nusw hen retirement was postponed from ages sixty-ﬁve or sixty-six by
oney ear. Nevertheless, because beneﬁts are proportional to the years of
service, a worker withf e w er years of service would get lower beneﬁts even
before the bonus. With a constant income proﬁle and forty years of service,
each year of earlier retirement decreased pension beneﬁts by 2.5 percent.
This is substantially less than the actuarial adjustment, which increases
from about 5.5 percent for postponing retirement one year at age sixty to
8p ercent for postponing retirement one year at age sixty-ﬁve. The 1992
pension reform will gradually change this by introducing retirement age–
speciﬁc adjustment factors to the beneﬁt formula. However, they will re-
main about 2 percent below those required for actuarial fairness. Figure
9.2 displays actuarial adjustments as well as those under the current (i.e.,
relevant foro ur working sample) and future institutional settings.
Disability pensions before reaching age sixty are particularly generous.
First, the service life used in a similar computation as for old-age pensions
is extended by the time between the onset of the disability and age sixty,
albeit at a reduced earnings base at two-thirds of the last earnings. Second,
disability beneﬁts are not actuarially adjusted, even after the 1992 reform,
buta re computed as if the worker had retired at age sixty. Disability pen-
sionsa f ter age sixty are computed like old-age pensions, but without actu-
arial adjustments.
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 285Thek ey statistic needed to measure the early retirement incentives ex-
erted by the actuarially unfair adjustment factors is the change in social
security wealth. If social security wealth declines because the increase in
the annual pension is not large enough to oﬀset the shorter time of pension
receipt, workers have a ﬁnancial incentive to retire earlier. We deﬁne social
security wealth as the expected present discounted value of beneﬁts minus
applicable contributions. Seen from the perspective of a worker who is S
yearso ld and plans to retire at age R,s ocial security wealth (SSW) is




























YLABt labor income at age t,
YPENt(R)p ension income at age t for retirementa ta g eR,
ct contribution rate to pension system at age t,
Fig. 9.2 Adjustment of retirement beneﬁts to retirement age
Source: Bo ¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel 1998.
Notes: RR1972 denotes the adjustment factors introduced by the 1972 pension reform.
RR1992 symbolizes the adjustments that will be phased in by the 1992 pension reform.
“Fair” refers to actuarially fair adjustment factors.
286 Axel Bo ¨rsch-SupanFig. 9.3 Loss in social security wealth when postponing retirement (1972 rules,
old-age pensions only): (A) accrual rate, (B) implicit tax rate
Source: Bo ¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel 1998
Note: See text for deﬁnition of accrual rate ACCRS(t)a n di m plicit tax rate TAXRS(t)f o rS 
55 and t  55 . . . 69.
at probability to survive at least until age t given survival until
age S,a n d
 discount factor  1/(1  r).


















A negative accrual can be interpreted as a tax on further labor force partic-
ipation. It is particularly handy to express this as an implicit tax rate: the
ratioo fthe (negative) social security wealth accrual to the net wages
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Figure 9.3 shows that the early retirement incentives created by the old-
agep ension formula in Germany are strong. We will see below that the
incentives created by disability beneﬁts are even stronger. The accrual
function (panel A) has three distinctive kink points. The ﬁrst kink occurs
at ages ixty, the earliest retirement age into the public pension system with-
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 287out disability status. Two other kinks are generated by the bonus for post-
poning retirement at ages sixty-ﬁve and sixty-six, interrupting the steady
increase in negative pension wealth accrual.
The lack of actuarial fairness of the old-age pension system creates a
negative accrual of pension wealth during the early retirement window at
ar ater e aching 9p ercent when retirement is postponed from age sixty-
four to sixty-ﬁve. In 1995, this was a loss of about 22,000 deutsche mark
(US$10,500 at purchasing power parity) for the average worker. Expressed
as a percentage of annual labor income, the loss corresponds to a “tax”
that exceeds 50 percent.
The 1992 pension reform will moderate but not abolish this incentive
eﬀect. After 2004, when the 1992 reform will have been fully phased in,
the negative accrual rate will reach 5p ercent, corresponding to an im-
plicit tax rate of almost 30 percent when retirement is postponed by one
year at ages ixty-four.
Disability beneﬁts create even stronger labor supply disincentives. The
resulting implicit tax rates for postponing retirement are very large (see
ﬁgure 9.4). They are likely to create strong incentives to manipulate dis-
ability eligibility: If there is a chance to claim disability, not taking it corre-
sponds to a 60 percent implicit tax on earnings.
9.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
How do these incentives aﬀect actual retirement behavior? We use the
1984–96 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to tackle
this question. The GSOEP is an annual panel study of some 6,000 house-
holds and some 15,000 individuals. Its design corresponds closely to that
Fig. 9.4 Implicit tax on postponing retirement, disability case
Source: Bo ¨rsch-Supan and Schnabel 1998.
Note: See text for deﬁnition of implicit tax rate TAXRS(t).
288 Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supanof the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Response rates and
panel mortality are also comparable to those for the PSID. The GSOEP
data provide a detailed account of income and employment status. The
data are used extensively in Germany, and the increasing interest in the
United States prompted the construction of an English-language user ﬁle
available from Richard Burkhauser and his associates at Syracuse Univer-
sity. Burkhauser (1991) reports on the usefulness of the German panel
data and provides English-language code books for the internationally ac-
cessible GSOEP version. Since 1990, the West German panel has been
augmented by an East German sample.
For this paper, however, I use only West German workers because prere-
tirement is frequent in East Germany and I lack the necessary company-
speciﬁc information to describe the incentives appropriately. My working
sample consists of all West Germans who are aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to seventy
yearsa nd have at least one spell of employment in this window in order
to reconstruct an earning history. This working sample includes 1,610 indi-
viduals. We construct an unbalanced panel of these individuals with 8,577
observations and an average observation time of 5.3 years. A few sample
persons are right-truncated with respect to retirement (i.e., they are em-
ployed throughout the entire window period) but most individuals retire
before the age of seventy. Of the 1987 individuals, 666 have no transitions,
643 have a single transition from employment to retirement, and 301 indi-
viduals have more complex histories with at least one reverse transition.
Thirty-ﬁve percent are female, and the most common retirement age is
sixty.
I deﬁne a worker to be retired when the self-reported employment status
is “out of labor force.” This includes unemployed workers and workers on
preretirement who may not receive public pensions but may receive other
support ranging from unemployment beneﬁts to severance pay. Figure 9.5
depicts the percentage of retired persons in my working sample and shows
three distinct jumps: the largest at age sixty, and two smaller ones at ages
sixty-three and sixty-ﬁve, corresponding to the earliest ages at which eligi-
bility to various pension types begins (see section 9.2). Very few individu-
als are working after age sixty-ﬁve. These patterns in the working sample
strongly correspond to administrative records (e.g., Verband deutscher
Rentenversicherungstra ¨ger [VdR] 1997). Even before oﬃcial old-age re-
tirement begins, about 15 percent of the workers have retired. This per-
centagei no ur working sample is somewhat lower than in the administra-
tive records, depicted in ﬁgure 9.1, indicating that the working sample
underrepresents problem cases who retire very early. This reﬂects the
middle-class bias typical for the GSOEP.
The jump at age sixty is due to three institutional features. Women with
a work history of at least ﬁfteen years may retire at age sixty; any unem-
ployed worker may retire at age sixty if certain mild requirements are satis-
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 289ﬁed; and, most importantly, workers who are able to claim “old-age dis-
ability” may also retire already at age sixty. This old-age disability between
ages sixty-one and sixty-ﬁve has weaker health and job status require-
ments than “normal disability” before age sixty.
Disability is oﬃcially measured as percent of earnings capability. If this
falls below 50 percent, workers after age sixty can claim a disability pen-
sion that corresponds to a normal pension, without actuarial adjustments.
Indeed, the average degree of disability in the sample increases steadily
until age sixty-two, when it reaches 20 percent. After age sixty-three, it
increases much more slowly (see ﬁg. 9.6).
Since it seems implausible that this sudden change is caused by a change
in health status, this pattern suggests an institutional reason. It is easy to
ﬁnd. From age sixty-three on, all male workers can receive a normal pen-
sion,p rovided they have thirty-ﬁve years of work (which most male work-
ers have). In fact, a striking ﬁnding is the weak correlation between the
degree of disability and self-reported health. Figure 9.7 shows that self-
reported health changes very little, and although a regression of the degree
of disability on self-reported health features a signiﬁcant positive correla-
tion between bad health and disability, its R2 is only about 3 percent.
Partly, this weak correlation is due to the fact that disability status is
granted not only for health-related but also for employment-related rea-
sons. Even healthy workers are classiﬁed as disabled if there are no jobs
available for their speciﬁc skills. Leniency in those regulations has changed
frequently and unpredictably. They were subject not only to government
Fig. 9.5 Self-reported retirement by age
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1984–96 and author’s calculations.
290 Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supanpolicy (e.g., in order to manipulate the unemployment rate) but also to law
cases (which at some point ruled, for example, that earnings tests for disa-
bled workers were illegal).
9.4 Alternative Estimates of Incentive Eﬀects to Retire Early
Thee vidence in the previous section suggests that disability is an impor-
tant mechanism for early retirement. However, even in the lenient German
system, disability is not granted automatically. Only 16 percent in my
Fig. 9.7 Average self-reported health on a 0–10 scale
Source: GSOEP 1984–96 and author’s calculations
Fig. 9.6 Average degree of disability by age (percentage)
Source: GSOEP 1984–96 and author’s calculations
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 291working sample report a disability status of 50 percent or more. In addi-
tion, the discussion at the end of the preceding section has shown that
when onei splanning ahead for the choice of retirement age, it is far from
clear whether this exit pathway can be taken. Incentives for early retire-
ment thus have a strong element of uncertainty, which must be built into
measures of incentive eﬀects.
Ic a pture the economic incentives provided by the pension system using
the option value to postpone retirement (Stock and Wise 1990). This value
captures for each retirement age the trade-oﬀ between retiring now (re-
sulting in a stream of retirement beneﬁts that depends on this retirement
age) and keeping all options open for some later retirement date (with
associated streams of ﬁrst labor, then retirement incomes for all possible
later retirement ages). Consequently, the option value for a speciﬁc age is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the maximum attainable consumption
utility if the worker postpones retirement to some later year minus the
utility of consumption that the worker can aﬀord ifh eo rs h ew o uld retire
now. The deﬁnition corresponds closely to the construction of social secu-
rity wealth in the preceding section.
Let Vt(R)d enote the expected discounted future utility at age t if the
worker retires at age R. Let R*(t)d enote the optimal retirement age if the
workerp o stpones retirement past age t, i.e., max[Vt(R)] for r  t.W i t h
this notation, the option value is
OPTVAL( ) [ *( )] ( ). tV R t V t tt =−
Since a worker is likely to retire as soon as the utility of the option to
postpone retirement becomes smaller than the utility of retiring now, re-
tirement probabilities should depend negatively on the option value.
Is p e c ify the expected utility as follows:















YLAB YRET  
with
YLABs labor income at age s, s  t ...R  1,
YRETs(R)e xpected retirement income at age s, s  R,
R retirement age,
 marginal utility of leisure, to be estimated,
a probability to survive at least until age s,a n d
 discount factor, set at 3 percent.
To capture the utility from leisure, utility during retirement is weighted
by 1, where 1/ is the marginal disutility of work. We use an estimate
of 3.13 that was obtained by grid search (see Bo ¨rsch-Supan 2000). A
dollar that must be earned by work is therefore valued at only about a
292 Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supanthird of a dollar that is given as a public transfer through the retirement
system. This value is somewhat higher than estimates for the United States
(Stock and Wise 1990) but not implausible for Germany with an arguably
higher preference for leisure. I apply a very simple utility function by iden-
tifying consumption with income. Preliminary estimates with an isoelastic
utility function, u(Y)  Y, yield a  coeﬃcient that is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 1. Finally, the discount factor  is assumed to be 3 percent.
Other discount factors in the range between 1 and 6 percent yield qualita-
tively similar results.
Uncertainty enters the option value through future income. For labor
income, I assume it to be constant after age ﬁfty-ﬁve. This is typical for
German workers who have seniority rules that ﬂatten out about this age.
However, retirement income depends on retirement age and the rules ap-
plicable to the individual at that age. As stressed before, it is uncertain
which rules will actually apply.
Thec ommon procedure in the literature is to use the retirement income
according to the rules that have ex post been applied to the sample individ-
ual. This procedure is correct for ﬁxed personal characteristics. For ex-
ample, as pointed out in section 9.2, German public pension rules have a
more generous retirement age for women than for men. Hence, male per-
sons are assigned pension rules for males, and females likewise.
Similarly, the literature has typically assigned disabled individuals a
pension according to the rules for disabled workers. However, as opposed
to such ﬁxed characteristics as gender, this procedure ignores both uncer-
tainty and potential endogeneity. First, the option value approach is an ex
ante (not an ex post) view of the utility of a certain retirement age. The ex
ante uncertainty cannot be resolved by the econometrician by using its ex
post value. Rather, one needs to use the expected value applicable at the
time of decision making. Speciﬁcally, the ability to claim disability status
is not certain at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, the beginning of my decision window. The
retirement income YRET in the above equation should therefore be a
probability-weighted sum of the relevant pathways, in this simple case
“disability” and “normal retirement.”
Moreover, as stressed before, eligibility can be manipulated to some ex-
tent, and there are strong incentives to do so. Thus the probability of tak-
ing this pathway is potentially endogenous. I therefore must use an instru-
mental variable (IV) approach to compute ﬁtted probabilities of the
pathways “disability” and “normal retirement.” This leads to four variants
of the option value to postpone retirement:
● The tough variant. All individuals are assigned retirement incomes ac-
cording to normal retirement rules.
● The generous variant. All individuals are assigned retirement incomes
as if they could claim disability beneﬁts.
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 293● The endogenous variant. Disabled persons are assigned disability pen-
sions, nondisabled persons normal pensions.
● The probabilistic variant. Individuals are assigned an expected value,
where disability pensions are weighted by a probability p,a n dnormal
pensions by (1  p). Taking the endogeneity of p into account, I use
three IV approaches:
a. I use the population frequency of being disabled (15.97 percent),
b. Ir egress the probability of having a degree of disability of 50 per-
cent or higher on a cubic polynomial in age and use this ﬁtted value
as probability p,a n d
c. I regress the probability of having a degree of disability of 50 per-
cent or higher on a cubic polynomial in age, a set of branch and
education dummies, plus gender and marital status, and use this
ﬁtted value as probability p.
I then insert the resulting option value into a discrete choice model with
“retired” as the dependent variable, and add the usual suspects as other
explanatory variables: an array of socioeconomic variables such as gender,
marital status, and wealth (indicator variables of several ﬁnancial and real
wealth categories), and a self-assessed health measure. Obviously, I cannot
use the legal disability status as a measure of health because this is poten-
tially endogenous.
Inserting the option value in a regression-type model is much less com-
putationally involved and more practical than the estimation procedure
employed by Stock and Wise (1990), which in turn much more closely
approximates the underlying dynamic programming structure (Rust and
Phelan 1997; see Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1992). The regression ap-
proach generates robust estimates of the average eﬀects of the option value
on retirement, although it is inferior in predicting individual choices when
incentives vary widely across individuals.
Ib egin by using a simple logit model. Table 9.1 presents a summary,
table 9.2 the full range of results.
In the “generous” speciﬁcation of expected retirement income—“every-
body is eligible for disability beneﬁts”—the sign of the option value co-
eﬃcienti sc ounterintuitive. All other speciﬁcations have the expected neg-
ative sign: An increase in the option value to postpone retirement
decreases the probability of being retired. The probabilistic variants are
very close to each other and are bracketed by the “generous” and the
“tough” variants. The ﬁrst-stage R2si nthe last two speciﬁcations are 8
and 15 percent, respectively. The “endogenous” speciﬁcation, however, is
far outside this bracket, considerably larger and with an (apparent) very
high precision as indicated by the t-statistic. The endogeneity bias pro-
duces a threefold higher estimate of the option value coeﬃcient than the
probability-weighted speciﬁcations.
294 Axel Bo ¨rsch-SupanTable 9.2 presents the full results. A positive coeﬃcient indicates that
the corresponding explanatory variable increases the probability of retire-
ment. In addition to the option value, health, and an array of socioeco-
nomic variables, we include a full set of age dummies to nonparametrically
capture all other unmeasured eﬀects on the retirement decision that are
systematically related to age, such as social customs. The reference cate-
gory is age sixty-ﬁve.
Prediction success rates are high and vary from 88.7 to 89.3. This ﬁt
compares favorably to the baseline probability of 67.9 percent of retirees
in our working sample. Except for the diﬀerence among the option value
coeﬃcients, all other coeﬃcient estimates are fairly close to each across
the six speciﬁcations.
Theo ther economic incentives for retirement, namely the wealth vari-
ables,a re only partially signiﬁcant. The GSOEP data do not contain levels
of wealth and provide only indicators of whether certain portfolio compo-
nents—ﬁrm pension, life insurance, stock and bonds, and real estate—are
present. There are many missing values, here coded as “not present.” In
general, presence of ﬁnancial and real wealth decreases the retirement
probability. This is not especially plausible for the presence of a ﬁrm pen-
sion.H owever, signiﬁcant ﬁrm pensions are rare in Germany and usually
indicate more highly valued jobs in which retirement may occur later for
reasons not related to the ﬁrm pension per se.
Thep a ttern of age dummies reﬂects the obvious: Older workers are
more likely retired than younger ones. It is important to measure the op-
tion value with the age dummies included in order to purge its estimated
Table 9.1 Option Value Coeﬃcients for Six Variants of Expected
Retirement Income
Estimated
Coeﬃciento fOption Value t-statistic
Model 1 (generous variant) 0.0053 4.63
(0.00115)
Model 2 (tough variant) 0.0046 4.72
(0.00098)
Model 3 (endogenous variant) 0.0096 12.02
(0.00080)
Model 4a (p  sample frequency) 0.0034 2.79
(0.00122)
Model 4b (p  agep olynomial) 0.0038 3.28
(0.00116)
Model 4c (p  full regression) 0.0032 2.84
(0.00114)
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSOEP working panel of men, 1984–96.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See text for explanation of variants.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.coeﬃcientf rom all other noneconomic eﬀects. The omission of age dum-
mies roughly triples the estimated coeﬃciento fthe option value. Quite
noticeablei sthe lack of spikes in the pattern of age dummies. In this sense,
retirement behavior is correctly described by the option value, the main
economic incentive forr e t irement.
Most other sociodemographic variables are not signiﬁcant. The impor-
tant diﬀerences between social security regulations for women and men
(women can retire at age sixty if they have at least ﬁfteen years of retire-
ment insurance history, whereas men need thirty-ﬁve years to retire at age
sixty-three, unless they claim disability) appears to be fully captured by
the option value. Marital status and education is also insigniﬁcant. I did
notd of ull justice to the retirement subsystem for civil servants. They are
actually treated as if they were part of the standard social security system,
whichi sn ot really the case. Civil servants are required to work longer than
other employees, with a fairly rigid retirement age at sixty-ﬁve, although
claims to disability are frequent, as is early retirement due to the downsiz-
ing of the civil service sector. I ﬁnd an expected negative coeﬃcient, indi-
cating later retirement for civil servants.
One may be suspicious that a simple logit model biases results because
it ignores the panel nature of the working sample. I therefore employ a
panel Probit model that permits a combination of random eﬀects and se-
rial correlation. This model follows Bo ¨rsch-Supan (2000), where all neces-
sary econometric details are presented. It is estimated by numerical simu-
lation methods (see Bo ¨rsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 1993). The model can
be interpreted as a semi-nonparametric hazard model for multiple-spell
data, permitting unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. It is
nonparametric in the sense that the model does not impose a functional
form on the duration in a given state. Fairly ﬂexible hazard rate models
of retirement have been estimated by Sueyoshi (1989) and Meghir and
Whitehouse (1997), although not in combination with an option value de-
scribing the incentives to retire. Parametric hazard rate models for Ger-
man data have been estimated by Schmidt (1995) and Bo ¨rsch-Supan and
Schmidt (1996).
Ie stimate three models, using the probabilistic version of the option
value based on the full regression (speciﬁcation 4c in tables 9.1 and 9.2).
Model 1 has independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) errors and
corresponds to the logit model of the last three columns of table 2. Note
that Probit coeﬃciente stimates are smaller by the square root of 
/6
(which is 0.7797) than their logit counterparts. Model 2 corrects for unob-
served heterogeneity by a random eﬀectw hose standard deviation is re-
ported at the bottom of table 9. 3. Finally, Model 3 adds an autoregressive
error component to Model 2. Estimation results are presented in table 9.3.
Although even the simple i.i.d. model ﬁts the data well (the pseudo-R2—
one minus the ratio of the likelihood at the estimated parameters over the







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.likelihood at zero—is 60.5 percent), introducing random eﬀects increases
the log-likelihood signiﬁcantly: The pseudo-R2 increases to 69.7 percent.
The additional inclusion of an autoregressive component is also statisti-
cally signiﬁcant: The pseudo-R2 nowr ises to 70.1 percent). The prediction
success is about 89 percent for all three models, the same as for the logit
models.
My most important results relate to the coeﬃcients of the option value.
Taking account of the intertemporal correlations in the panel appears to
be very important. The numerical value of the option value coeﬃcient is
severely underestimated in the i.i.d. model. With random eﬀects (capturing
individual speciﬁc unobserved variables) and an autoregressive error (cap-
turing the declining inﬂuence of such shocks as illness), the coeﬃcient
estimate of the option value quadruples and is estimated much more pre-
cisely.T his also holds for the endogenous speciﬁcation, although to a
lesser extent (see Bo ¨rsch-Supan, 2000).
There is little change in the other explanatory variables across distur-
bance speciﬁcations, with one important exception: the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of the health variable, which is coded 0 for “very poor” to 10 for
“excellent.” As expected, the coeﬃcients are negative. Less-healthy work-
ers retire earlier. In the i.i.d. model, health is more signiﬁcant than the
option value. However, as soon as unobserved population heterogeneity is
accounted for, this changes, and the estimated coeﬃcient becomes some-
what smaller. This shows the importance to account for intertemporal link-
ages. In the absence of random eﬀects, health appears to capture unmeas-
ured population heterogeneity that is taken out by the random eﬀects to
the extent that it is time invariant.
9.5 Conclusions
The main point of the paper was to account for uncertainty and poten-
tial endogeneity of the expected retirement income in models measuring
the incentive eﬀects of public pension rules on early retirement. We were
able to bracket the coeﬃciente stimates in an option value model by the
two extremes (all are eligible for disability beneﬁts; nobody is eligible for
disability beneﬁts). However, using the endogenous speciﬁcation (all those
aree xa nte eligible for disability beneﬁts who have ex post disability status)
yields a badly upwardly-biased coeﬃcient (i.e., it badly exaggerates the
incentive eﬀects of pension provisions). I employ an IV approach to cor-
rect for this endogeneity, using employment and human capital character-
istics as instruments in a ﬁrst-stage regression that generates a ﬁtted prob-
ability for the pathway “disabled.”
I then proceeded to a more complicated stochastic model that accounts
for random eﬀects (capturing individual-speciﬁc unobserved variables)
and an autoregressive error (capturing the declining inﬂuence of such
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 301shocks as illness). Such a model can be interpreted as some convenient
functional form to account for individual-speciﬁc deviations from the
ﬁtted expected retirement income as well, although the model is not struc-
tural because expected retirement income enters the option value in a com-
plicated nonlinear fashion, due to the maximization over present dis-
counted values. Our fullest speciﬁcation yields a coeﬃcient estimate of the
option value that is quadrupled relative to the i.i.d. case. Moreover, it is
estimated much more precisely than by the i.i.d. model.
It h u sh a v ec o r r e c t e df o rt w oe ﬀects vis-a `-vis conventional models. First,
Ic orrected for the exaggerated option value coeﬃcient due to uncertainty
and endogeneity of expected retirement income. Second, I corrected for
the underestimated option value coeﬃcienti nam odel that disregards the
panel nature of the data. By chance, the two eﬀects roughly compensate
each other in my working sample of German workers aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to
seventy.
What do the estimated magnitudes of the option value coeﬃcientsmean
in practice? Using the full model in table 9.3, one can simulate a shift from
the currently less than actuarially fair system of adjustment factors (see ﬁg.
9.2) to an actuarially fair system. This change would shift the cumulative
retirement distribution function down from what it is currently, as depicted
in ﬁgure 9. 5. The eﬀect ism o s td r a m a t i cf o rv ery early retirement, where
the discrepancy between disability and normal retirement incentives are
the largest (see ﬁg. 9.4). The policy change would cause retirement at ages
ﬁfty-nine and below to drop from 28.6 percent to about 16.5 percent.
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Comment Daniel McFadden
Working within the NBER framework for analysis of retirement behavior
established by David Wise and various coauthors (see Hausman and Wise
1985, Stock and Wise 1990, and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1994),
Bo ¨rsch-Supan’s paper addresses the problems presented when there are
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 3031. In the Stock-Wise formulation, the utility of consumption is weighted diﬀerently in work
and retirement years. When hours are set institutionally for workers, rather than being cho-
sen by optimization, this setup follows naturally from a Cobb-Douglas utility function of
consumption and leisure. My reformulation follows from a utility function that is additive in
consumption and a function of leisure. In the Stock-Wise formulation, intertemporal substi-
tution of consumption through borrowing and lending is ignored, and current disposable
income is fully consumed. This is a substantial simpliﬁcation that, as an empirical matter, is
notab ad approximation. On the other hand, private saving decisions are potentially quite
important at the retirement timing margin. In my reformulation, private saving is permitted,
but because of perfect intertemporal substitution of consumption, is essentially irrelevant to
the retirement decision.
multiple paths to retirement. The setting is the German social security
system, where early retirement options based on disability are an impor-
tant alternative to normal retirement. This is an outstanding paper that
identiﬁes an important errors-in-variables issue in estimating option value
models for retirement behavior when ex ante option values are latent.
Bo ¨rsch-Supan demonstrates a practical, statistically satisfactory method
ford e aling with this problem, and uses it to show that appropriate han-
dling can make a big diﬀerence in the inferences one draws about the
eﬀectiveness of economic incentives in modifying retirement behavior.
Ther etirement decision is modeled as a series of binomial choices that
depend in each year on the option value of remaining in the labor force. I
have found it useful to start from a slight reformulation of the current
paper’s NBER model of the consumer’s life-cycle planning problem. Sup-
pose consumers are risk neutral with perfect intertemporal substitution of
consumption, and discount the future at the market rate, so that their ob-
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where Ct is consumption at age t, Lt is the consumption opportunity cost
of foregone leisure when working at age t, R is the retirement age, 
(t|s)i s
the probability of survival at age t conditioned on survival at age s,a n d
is the market discount rate.1 Thee xpected value of this objective function











































where YLABt is labor income at age t if working, net of taxes other than
social security tax, YRETt(R)i sl abor income at age t if retired at age R,
304 Axel Bo ¨rsch-SupanWs is the value of assets (including the actuarial value of private pensions)
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the expected presentv alue of the consumption opportunity cost of fore-
gone leisure. Substituting the constraint into the objective function yields
the result that R will be chosen to maximize the expected value of
(4) PW SSW PL ss s RR R () () () . +−
Theo ption value of postponing retirement at planning age s is
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Retirement occurs at the age R*w here Gs ﬁrst turns negative. Let Hs 
{SSWs(R*)  SSWs(s)}; then Hs canb ei n terpreted as the contribution of
social security wealth to option value. Ordinarily one would expect
[YLABt  Lt]t ob eamonotonically declining function of age t over the
relevant ager ange, as worker productivity reﬂected in YLABt stabilizes or
falls and the burden of working reﬂected in Lt rises.I fthis expression goes
from positive to negative at an age RN, then this is a “natural” retirement
agei nthe absence of a social security system. If Hs  0f o rs  RN, the
social security system creates an incentive to retire earlier than the natural
age. An ecessary condition for the consumer planning at age s to retire
immediately is the one-year-ahead comparison
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Ar eduction in social security wealth when retirement is postponed, due
to incomplete actuarial adjustment for delayed beneﬁts, imposes an im-
plicit tax rate on income that is a disincentive to continued work. This may
be enough to trigger early retirement. It is the possibility of opportunities
in the future, encoded in the option value, that prevents this condition’s
being necessary and suﬃcient; the option value may make postponing at-
tractive even if a one-year delay is not. However, a suﬃcient condition for
the consumer to postpone retirement is that this inequality be reversed.
To convert equation (5) to an econometric model, one could plausibly
assume that the Lt arer andomly distributed across individuals, with means
that are functions of observed demographics. If, for example, the Lt con-
tain additive independent Extreme Value I errors, then the binomial deci-
sion to retire now will be given by a mixed logit model, with mixing over
any remaining random elements in the option values. This diﬀers in some
details from the models ﬁtted in the paper, particularly the weighting of
retirement versus wage income to account for the value of leisure, but it is
essentially the same in its general approach. In particular, the mixing
would permit consideration of unobserved eﬀects that extend over a se-
quenceof years, including individual random eﬀects and serially correlated
eﬀects, and would provide one practical alternative to the multinomial
probit analysis in the paper; see McFadden and Train (2000). The reformu-
lated option value model makes it clear why the spectacular implicit tax
rates in the German social security system, shown in Bo ¨rsch-Supan’s ﬁg-
ures 9.3 and 9.4, provide a powerful incentive for early retirement.
Before turning to the issue of multiple retirement paths induced by the
disability options in the German social security system, it is useful to make
someg eneral comments on the NBER formulation of the consumer’s prob-
lema nd the reformulation just given. First, the assumptions that the con-
sumer is risk neutral, that consumption is perfectly substitutable between
periods, and that the rate of substitution is the market discount rate times
the one-year-ahead survival probability are all very special, and not neces-
sarily realistic. Add the further assumptions that the uncertain future, con-
ditioned on survival, can be expressed in terms of certainty equivalents,
306 Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supanthat current wealth and future income streams can be annuitized eﬀec-
tively into a consumption stream with the same present value, and that the
consumer places no additional strategic value on new information that will
be garnered if retirement is postponed. Then the retirement decision will
be driven by the option value equation (5). The NBER formulation that
ﬂows from these assumptions is an analytically simple and empirically
relevant approximation that provides a powerful tool for analyzing retire-
ment behavior. It avoids the problems of a dynamic stochastic program-
ming formulation of the life-cycle planning problem, which produces an
analytic dog’s breakfast. However, the assumptions listed above indicate
that it has a cost in that it may miss critical interactions of saving behavior,
consumption proﬁles, and retirement timing that can arise if intertemporal
substitution is imperfect and risk aversion is signiﬁcant. Furthermore,
simple certainty-equivalence and independence assumptions may miss
economically important interactions; for example, if uncertain retirement
income is correlated with mortality risk because frail individuals are less
productive and shorter lived, or because frail individuals are more likely
to attain retirement paths based on disability or opt for retirement payout
options that are front-loaded, then the relevant certainty-equivalent retire-
ment income should be conditioned on individual frailty. These are already
issues in the standard NBER retirement analysis, and even more so when
disability-dependent retirement paths and attendant uncertain retirement
income are introduced.
I turn ﬁnally to the substance of Bo ¨rsch-Supan’s paper, the innovative
examination of the impact of multiple retirement paths induced by disabil-
ityr etirement possibilities in the German social security system. The rele-
vant number for the consumer’s decision is the ex ante option value of
delaying retirement, taking into account the probabilities of various retire-
ment path/retirement income alternatives. As the paper explains, if a con-
sumer qualiﬁes for a disability pension now or in the future, the option of
early retirement may open, and the actuarial treatment of these pensions
may operate to the consumer’s beneﬁt. This creates an incentive for the
employee to game the system by feigning more incapacitating disabilities,
possibly with the connivance of the employer if the productivity of the
workeri sb elow the legal or contractual wage level. As detective novels
point out, murder is a matter of motive and opportunity. It appears that
many German employees have the motive to qualify as excessively disa-
bled; the question is how much opportunity the system provides, through
lax or ambiguous standards for qualiﬁcation. Bo ¨rsch-Supan observes a
natural experiment in which disability-qualiﬁed retirements dropped
sharply following a 1972 reform that oﬀered ﬂexible retirement as an alter-
native. This could certainly have been the result of improper disability
qualiﬁcation before 1972; but a more benign alternative is that after 1972
the ﬂexible retirement option was ﬁnancially or administratively more at-
Social Security under an Uncertain Disability Option 307tractive to individuals who might otherwise have legitimately qualiﬁed for
a disability-based pension. If disability qualiﬁcation is endogenous, inﬂu-
enced by worker productivity and commitments to work, the problem that
this introduces for the economic analyst is that instead of having one-
wayc ausation from retirement income to the retirement decision, one has
simultaneous determination of retirement and postretirement income.
Thep ossibility of disability-based retirement introduces uncertainty
into the option value calculation at several points. From the standpoint of
the consumer, option values are uncertain because pension payments in
future years will depend on whether the consumer would at those times
qualify under a disability option. The paper does not spell it out, but there
may also be uncertainty associated with application for a disability-
qualiﬁed pension: What happens to the individual if an application is qual-
iﬁed at a diﬀerent disability level than anticipated, or if the application is
refused?A re there any downstream consequences to applying for a
disability-based pension and not qualifying, such as more careful review
of a subsequent application? An important econometric implication of un-
certainty is that ex post observed retirement income is not the same as the
ex ante certainty equivalent upon which option value–based retirement
decisions are made. This can be cast as an errors-in-variables problem,
with the nonlinearity of the retirement probability model precluding the
simplestc orrections for this problem.
Thep aper provides a practical solution to the errors-in-variables prob-
lem, carrying out careful reconstruction of an ex ante probabilistically
weighted option value, with probabilities that are themselves estimated
taking into account the reduced-form probability of being disabled. The
paper also considers, for purposes of comparison, two extreme ex ante
alternatives: the “tough” variant, in which no disability-based pensions
arec onsidered, and the “generous” variant, in which only disability-based
pensions are considered. A ﬁnal “endogenous” variant is close to an ex
post representation of the option value, using the eventual classiﬁcation of
the individual as disabled to impute a retirement path.
It may be useful to comment on the relationship between these construc-
tionsa nd purely statistical methods of dealing with the nonlinear errors-
in-variables problems. Abstracting from the model details, the binomial
indicator rs for retirement at age s,g ivenn oe arlier retirement, has expecta-
tion p(rs|G* s ), where G* s is the latent ex ante option value. The observed ex
post option value Gs (which may be multidimensional) and G* s have a joint
density f(Gs, G* s |xs)c o n d i t ioned on exogenous variables xs.T he probability
of rs given xs and Gs is then
Pr G x
pr G fG G x d G
fGG x d G
ss s
ss s ss s
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308 Axel Bo ¨rsch-SupanIf a functional form is speciﬁed for p and a parametric density for f, then
the probability P canb ef ormed analytically or numerically, and ordinary
maximum likelihood estimation can be carried out using P. Alternately,
onec an assume that P is contained in a speciﬁed parametric family; under
quiteg e neral conditions, there will exist f and p functions that are consis-
tent with P.T he approach of the paper follows the second alternative. This
is just as legitimate as the ﬁrst method, particularly given the lack of reli-
able a priori information on the forms of p and f.H o w ever, it becomes an
interesting question whether the family of {f, p} pairs that generate speci-
ﬁed P functions are economically plausible.
The key ﬁndings of the paper are that the endogenous (or ex post) vari-
ant of the option value gives what appears to be a misleadingly large co-
eﬃciento nthe option value, and that the “generous” and “tough” variants
introduce substantial bias. Three alternative methods are tested for con-
struction of the probabilities in the probability-weighted option value; they
all give similar results. The paper also ﬁnds signiﬁcant individual random
eﬀects that appear in the sequence of decisions on retirement, and ﬁnds
that ignoring these eﬀects in applying the option value analysis leads to
substantial underestimates of the coeﬃciento no ption value. The mecha-
nism driving this result is that when individual random eﬀects are strong,
it is less likely that option values will by chance be large positive, and less
likely that a decision to retire will be taken despite what appears to be a
positive option value. The implication is that—unlike many discrete panel
data applications in which quasi-maximum likelihood estimation ignoring
serial correlation is consistent—this situation, in which the ex ante option
value depends on the joint distribution of the disturbances, requires full
consideration of the panel error structure to achieve consistency. While
these comments suggest that there are opportunities for interesting re-
search, I strongly endorse Bo ¨rsch-Supan’s main conclusion that it is impor-
tant and practical to reconstruct an accurate probability-weighted option
value when multiple retirement paths or pension qualiﬁcations introduce
uncertainty.
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